

**Constructing Cooperation in Northeast Asia:
Historical Northeast Asian Dyadic Cultures
and the Potential for Greater Regional Cooperation**

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What have been the regional power alignment patterns in Northeast Asia historically and what alignment pattern characterizes the region today? Given the prevalence of Realist understandings of Northeast Asian security competition and the determinism inherent in Realist assumptions about China's rise and the security competition that will breed in the region, etc., what might an alternative constructivist approach to Northeast Asian regional dynamics contribute to our understanding of the potential of the nations in Northeast Asia to move toward greater cooperation, overcoming the numerous obstacles to regional cooperation that include the problems of historical memory, lack of trust, nationalism, the old security problems left over from the Cold War, and the new security problems that have arisen in the post-Cold War era? The Northeast Asian region is a region with a long history of regional international relations and regional structure patterns, ranging back from times when Imperial/Dynastic China reigned suzerain, to the 1911-1930 transitional period, to the so-called "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere" era (1931-1945) when Japan reigned supreme in the region, to the Cold War era (1945-1991), to the present post-Cold War era. This essay considers Realism(s), Neo-Liberal Institutionalism and constructivism as possible ways to view regional dynamics, then utilizes the constructivist approach to assess regional alignment patterns in Northeast Asian history corresponding to the time periods mentioned above. It does so by employing Wendt's system-level cultures of anarchy (Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures) at the dyadic/second level of analysis and the regional level of analysis (level 2.5), rating the various eras as to levels of cooperation vs. enmity, with an eye to identifying and addressing the reasons for today's tension points. It concludes that despite such tension points and unresolved historical issues, anarchy in Northeast Asia today is not of a Hobbesian nature but is rather more akin to a Lockean conceptualization. Consequently and first, war, nuclear proliferation and security spirals may be avoidable with proper sensitivity to the issues that continue to pose as obstacles to regional cooperation, including historical grievances, uncertainties over China's rise and the US role in the region, the North Korean nuclear issue, and others. Second, attention to improving each of the dyadic cultures (China-Japan, South Korea-North Korea, US-North Korea, etc.) that together comprise the region's relational culture (either Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian) make greater regional cooperation on the whole not only possible, but even more likely.

Constructing Cooperation in Northeast Asia: What is Holding the Region Back?

Northeast Asia (here defined as including the following states: China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea and Japan)¹ has in the past few decades become one of the most dynamic and strategic regions on

¹ At various times in Northeast Asian history, other players such as the Mongols, or today the United States, have played influential roles in the region and should be included in the regional mix, and are below. Today one may include here Taiwan/Republic of China as well, depending on how one defines "nation-states." Based on conventional definitions of "nation-state," the ROC has all the trappings of one, but lacks the international

earth. Given the phenomenal economic growth in the major states in Northeast Asia in recent decades, starting with Japanese growth beginning in the 1950s, followed by booms in Taiwan and South Korea in the 1970s, and then China in the 1980s, and very recently Russia with its energy-related boom, the region has become one of the most dynamic and important centers of economic activity in the world. It is of course also one of the most sensitive regions in the world from a security perspective, given the remaining divisions on the Korean Peninsula, between China and Taiwan (ROC), and between Japan on the one hand and the Koreas and China on the other over World War Two (WW2) legacies, not to mention the North Korea nuclear issue and a number of intense territorial disputes in the region. It is also a place where three of the world's nuclear powers, China, Russia and the United States, have strategic interests of great value for them all. Given the economic and security issues at stake in the region, peaceful coexistence and cooperation among the states in the region is imperative to global economic and geopolitical stability. Yet despite the advances in economic integration and interdependence, the rifts between some of the states in the region remain significant, even alarming, and the potential for social, economic, political, strategic, and/or even (God forbid) nuclear meltdown is unfortunately all too possible. What is holding the states and peoples of the region back from greater levels of stability, cooperation and even integration?

There are a number of major obstacles to greater Northeast Asian regional cooperation, including unresolved old security issues, a series of daunting new security issues, the rise of nationalism in the region, the problem of historical memory, an East Asian proclivity for what I call "face politics," and a deficit in trust or social capital between states and peoples in the region, each of which will be discussed below, and is enumerated in Table 1 below. Starting with what I've called old security issues, these refer to matters left over from both WW2 and the Cold War that complicate matters in the region, making cooperation and trust more difficult to manufacture. The continued tensions between the governments of the People's Republic of China (Mainland China) and the Republic of China (on Taiwan), though much improved in recent years, still have the potential to bring dysfunction and/or war to the region. The matter is of course an unresolved remnant from the Chinese Civil War of the 1940s, compounded by Cold War divisions. In like manner the division of the Korean Peninsula into North Korea (or Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and South Korea (or Republic of Korea) following WW2, and the ensuing Korean Civil War, compounded by the intensification of the Cold War and the particular totalitarian political structures introduced in Pyongyang contrasted with the more liberal reformist regimes in neighboring states, all have contributed to a profound state of irresolution and an ever-present danger of war on the peninsula and in the region. Related to and adding to these particular issues are what one might - from the Chinese, Russian and North Korean perspective in particular - call uncertainties over the meaning and longevity of continued US military presence in the region, case in point being US military bases in the region and some 28,500 US military personnel in South Korea and 35,688 US military personnel in Japan.² Another divisive issue in the region exists between Japan and Russia over what Russians call the Kurile Islands (north of the Japanese island of Hokkaido) and Japanese call the Northern Territories. Soviet forces occupied the isles with Japan's surrender in 1945 and the matter has been a source of dispute since. A last unresolved older regional security issue is the dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyudao by the Chinese) stemming primarily from disputes going back to Japan's 1895 annexation of the islands following its defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War of that year. Recent discoveries of oil and natural gas deposits near the islands and the growing importance of expanding fishing grounds to both nations have intensified the dispute in recent years.

In addition to these older unresolved security issues are a batch of newer, but still daunting

recognition and international organizational membership that is normally required for "statehood."

² From the perspective of Seoul and Tokyo, uncertainties and longevity of the military presence in the region have also issues, but perhaps for different reasons. Some in both South Korea and Japan would prefer an early US exit, but others - particularly during times of tension in the region over North Korea, island disputes or between Japan and China - have been concerned that the US was distracted by its wars in the Middle East, and was perhaps not wholly committed to, or up to, active defense of its treaty partners in Northeast Asia.

security issues that contribute to tension and a lack of trust in the region. Despite the disapprobation of all of the nations in the region, including China and Russia, North Korea's continuing push to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities are one of the most difficult issues the nations of the region are confronted with.³ Given its potential threat to regional security and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, a solution to this issue is of the highest importance. Another key issue for Northeast Asians are uncertainties surrounding the ultimate implications of a rising China. While Chinese growth has been a boon to the region, none of China's neighbors know what a mature China will want⁴ or represent in the region, particularly given the implications of Democratic Peace Theory⁵ and China's heretofore lack of liberal democracy. As was mentioned above in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute between Japan and China, greater competition for fishing rights as well as recent exploratory work which has revealed more and more oil and natural gas deposits in the seas surrounding Northeast Asian nations, have made this a greater source of tension, which has been compounded by a lack of agreement over the United Nations' Law of the Sea Treaty in conjunction with other historical disputes over islands and waterways in the region. A related and recently arising dispute exemplifies this issue, namely what Koreans call the Dokdo Islands (Takeshima in Japanese, Liancourt Rocks in English), which both Korea and Japan claim, and which are located between South Korea and Japan. Lastly, there are uncertainties in Beijing, Pyongyang and Moscow in particular over growing US and Japanese cooperation on building a regional missile defense system, which Tokyo and Washington argue is necessary given North Korean missile tests over Japan and in Japanese waters, and the growing number of Chinese missile forces adjacent to Taiwan, among other issues.

Another issue complicating hopes of regional cooperation is the matter of nationalism. We are not speaking here of patriotism, per se, or even of a garden variety of World-Cup-esque nationalism, but of serious, manufactured, in some cases approaching xenophobic, sorts of nationalism. It is striking that each of the nations in the region (China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea and Japan) have been growing in nationalistic tendencies in recent years. As it regards China, the general argument in the literature is that the ruling party has staked its claim to legitimacy not in democracy, per se, but in successful economic growth stoked by an appeal to nationalism, engendered by tools such as the Patriotic Education Campaign and state-controlled media.⁶ In like manner, Russia's post-Soviet, and now perhaps post-liberal, market-authoritarian leadership have found it increasingly expedient to limit free speech and free media in favor of a state-led appeal to state-first nationalism.⁷ North Korea, of course, is the region's and arguably the world's leader in the production of chest-beating gung-ho nationalism, based on a totalitarian-driven myth of divine origin and rule by Holy Trinity (in this case, Father, Son, and Holy Notion, i.e., Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and *Juche*, though perhaps now Kim Jong-un replaces Jim Jong-il in this conceptualization).⁸ Tame in comparison are South Korea and Japan, but both too have a considerable repository of nationalist fervor. South Korea holds a milder version of the *über*-nationalism of the DPRK, and shares some of its narratives about Korean exceptionalism and a tendency toward

³ For more, see Gregory J. Moore, ed., *North Korean Nuclear Operationality: Implications for Regional Security and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime* (forthcoming).

⁴ See Jeffrey Legro, "What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power," *Perspectives on Politics* (September, 2007): 515-534.

⁵ For more, see Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996).

⁶ Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2004).

⁷ See Jeffrey Mankov, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

⁸ See Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig, *North Korea Through the Looking Glass* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2000); and B.R. Myers, *The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves – and Why it Matters* (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Melville House, 2010).

xenophobia.⁹ In Japan, while the Japanese state is now a liberal one and does not support the production of nationalism as it did during the fascist years, nationalism production is a cottage industry on the far right of the Japanese political spectrum and it should not be underestimated, for it is formidable, even if marginal.¹⁰ The Northeast Asian region is, to my mind, unusually strong as a region in terms of the presence, degree and influence of nationalism over politics and foreign policy, and it makes cooperation among neighbors more difficult.

Table 1. Major Obstacles to Greater Northeast Asian Regional Cooperation (Snapshot, Late 2011)

1. Unresolved Old Security Issues (WW2 and Cold War Leftovers)
 - PRC/ROC Divide
 - DPRK/ROK Divide
 - Uncertainties over Meaning and Longevity of Continued US Military Presence in Region
 - Kurile Islands/Northern Territories Issue (Russia and Japan)
 - Diaoyudao/Senkaku Islands Issue (PRC/ROC and Japan)
2. Daunting New Security Issues
 - North Korea Nuclear Issue
 - Uncertainties about the Ultimate Implications of a Rising China
 - Disputes Over Natural Gas and Fishing Areas in Regional Waterways
 - Dokdo Islands Dispute (South Korea and Japan)
 - Uncertainties over US/Japanese Plans for Regional Missile Defense System
3. Nationalism in the Region is on the Rise Across the Board
 - China
 - Japan
 - South Korea
 - North Korea
 - Russia
4. Historical Memory (or Unresolved “Bad History”) Issue
 - From Perspective of PRC, ROK, DPRK Toward Japan, Unresolved Historical Issues
 - a. Apology Politics
 - b. Textbook Issue
 - c. Yasukuni Shrine Issue
 - Lingering Cold War Legacy/Discomfort Between former Eastern Bloc (PRC, DPRK and Russia) and “Western” Bloc (US, ROK, Japan, ROC) Members in Northeast Asia
5. East Asian Cultural Proclivity for “Face Politics” (面子政治) Makes Compromise More Difficult
6. Trust/Social Capital Deficit (Largely as a Result of 4.)

Perhaps the most important impediment to greater cooperation in Northeast Asia is the issue of historical memory, or what one might also call issues of unresolved “bad history.”¹¹ Though Japan has been a model national citizen since WW2, clearly its way of dealing with the legacy of WW2 has been much less satisfactory in the eyes of its neighbors than that of Germany.¹² The defeat of China in 1895 and the consequent annexation of Taiwan, the defeat of Russia in 1905 and the appropriation of a number

⁹ See Gi-Wook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006).

¹⁰ See B. Stronach, *Beyond the Rising Sun: Nationalism in Contemporary Japan*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995); S. Ishihara, *The Japan that can say No* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989/1991).

¹¹ See Gregory J. Moore, “History, Face and Nationalism in Sino-Japanese Relations,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 15/3 (September, 2010): 283-306.

¹² See Ian Baruma, *Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan* (New York: Plume, 1995).

of Russia's holdings in East Asia, the annexation of Korea in 1910, then Northeastern China in 1931, then the bulk of China in 1937, then the attack on Pearl Harbor (US) in 1941, and so on. Japan was not winning friends, though it was influencing a lot of people. During the war, Japan's Unit 731 in Heilongjiang Province committed unbelievable atrocities, as did other Japanese units around China.¹³ The Nanjing Massacre of 1937 was one of WW2's greatest killing fields but few outside of China and a few academic specialists and WW2 buffs know of it to this day, in contrast to the fame of Nazi killing fields such as Auschwitz.¹⁴

As it regards the history issue, from the perspective of China and the Koreans in particular, the apology issue, the textbook issue and the Yasukuni Shrine issue stand out most prominently. While many in Japan feel the apology issue should be laid to rest, most Chinese and many Koreans believe the Japanese have not truly apologized to their Asian neighbors for the crimes their nation committed during WW2. While Prime Minister Murayama apologized to China in 1995, he was a socialist and not really representative of mainstream Japanese (LDP) party politics or public opinion. Prime Minister Koizumi made a number of apologetic statements, but the Chinese are looking for the word "daoqian" (道歉) expressed directly to them by Japan's top, majority-party leadership and they have not had it, and this bothers them. The textbook issue is another open sore to Koreans and Chinese. Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) approves certain texts for use in Japanese public schools and so any history book that passes muster with them in effect reflects their approval of its contents. A number of history books that have been approved by the Ministry of Education have done a grave disservice to history and to the victims of Japan's WW2 aggression (refusing to use words such as "invasion" or acknowledge systematic exploitation of "comfort women," or acknowledge what happened in Nanjing in 1937 was a massacre, etc.), and another round of the textbook issue erupted in a fury outside Chinese embassies in Seoul and in Beijing as recently as 2004-05.¹⁵ In like manner, Japan's Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo is the source of disgruntlement in China and the Koreans. Yasukuni is a national shrine (not a tomb with remains, per se) that serves as the eternal resting place for those interred or enshrined here, which include many of Japan's war dead from many wars, but including war-era Prime Minister Hideki Tojo and 13 other Class A War Criminals. Prime Minister Koizumi made it a practice to visit the shrine once a year from 2001-2006, saying it was in the capacity of a private citizen, but signing his name, "Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi." To the Koreans and Chinese, this was in effect official honoring of war criminals and what they stood for. Each of these issues convey to Chinese and Korean ears a message from the Japanese to them to the effect of, "We have done nothing wrong and we are proud of what we did and honor those who did it." With these perceptions of events, it is difficult for Koreans and Chinese to trust Japanese and so deeper cooperation, such as that enjoyed by France and Germany today, will be slow in coming unless or until official Japanese policy embraces apology, curbs revisionist right wing text books, and steers clear of appearing to embrace Yasukuni Shrine at the least.

Also complicating hopes for cooperation in the region as a matter of historical memory is the lingering Cold War legacy that, more than ten years after the end of the Cold War, continues to engender a certain level of suspicion and distrust between former Eastern Bloc (PRC, DPRK and Russia) and "Western" Bloc (US, ROK, Japan, ROC) members in Northeast Asia. This is difficult to measure, but in "right-wing" (relative term) or "hawk" circles in each capitol there are persons (often in uniform, sometimes not) who maintain Cold War-era views of the members of the other bloc. The Cold War is certainly dead, but the Cold War as history is certainly not. Many of the persons who ran foreign policy

¹³ See Peter Li, ed., *The Search for Justice: Japanese War Crimes* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005); H. Gold, *Unit 731 Testimony* (North Clarendon: Tuttle Publishing, 2004); D. Barenblatt, *A Plague upon Humanity: The Secret Genocide of Axis Japan's Germ Warfare Operation* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2004).

¹⁴ The book that made it better known in the West was Iris Chang's, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

¹⁵ See Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," in *East Asian Security*, M.E. Brown, S.M. Lynn-Jones, and S.E. Miller, eds. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996); Gregory J. Moore, "History, Face and Nationalism in Sino-Japanese Relations," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 15/3 (September, 2010): 283-306.

and security policy for many of these nations in the waning years of the Cold War are still in position today and old habits do not die easily. It may be another generation before the distrust the Cold War brought to life is laid more fully to rest, and yet as the continued Chinese and Korean distrust of the Japanese more than 65 years after the end of WW2 may suggest, even then this may not be the case.

In addition, the East Asian cultural proclivity for “face politics” (面子政治) complicates international relations in the region because it makes compromise and “out of the box” thinking much more difficult. Peter Gries has done some work on the issue of face in the Chinese and more general East Asian contexts, and notes that while it is present in any culture to some degree, it plays a much more prevalent role in East Asian cultures.¹⁶ In discussing “saving face” and “keeping face,” he notes that face is a reflection of the need to maintain “ingroup positivity” and/or “collective self-esteem.” He notes that while it can be discussed in the individual or collective context, “face is fundamentally political, involving a contest over power. Parties vie for face...” leading at times to “cock fights.” On a more positive note this stress on face maintenance contributes to beautiful cultural forms which place great stress on civility, politeness and formal ritual in social interaction in typical interactions, and this can be seen in traditional Chinese, Korean and Japanese cultures.¹⁷ When civility breaks down, however, it can be very difficult to repair because of “face” issues, and this has been a problem in relations between Japan and its neighbors, all of which have “face expectations” they feel Japan has not met, the aforementioned apology, textbook and Yasukuni issues above being cases in point.

Finally, Northeast Asia suffers from a deficit of trust, and what Robert Putnam has, in a slightly different but still applicable context, called “social capital.”¹⁸ Putnam illustrates nicely the ways in which trust and social capital more generally lubricate the wheels of cooperation and (in his study) effective government as well as state-society relations. In the Northeast Asian context, the unresolved historical issues, the old and new security challenges, the issue of nationalism, and the lack of attention to other parties’ “face needs” all contribute to a basic lack of trust between the nations in the region. As Putnam’s study shows, insufficient social capital, trust in particular, increases the transaction costs of social interaction and lowers the level of efficiency and cooperation. Despite the impressive economic growth and the growth of interregional trade in the last few decades, it is clear that much higher levels of cooperation could be achieved if greater trust could be engendered in the region by each member addressing the history issue squarely and honestly, Japan in particular, and by respectfully addressing the “face needs” of the regional other. By addressing these issues first, it will be easier to deal with the “hard” issues, the security problems of both older and more recent origin which plague the region. Toward these ends, and buttressing these specific points at a more general level, Alexander Wendt’s theoretical contributions to the IR literature underline the importance of the state of relational culture toward improving regional cooperation. It is to Wendt that we now turn.

Wendt’s Contribution to our Understanding of Anarchic Structures

Alexander Wendt’s 1999 *Social Theory of International Politics*¹⁹ may be the most important and influential IR book since Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 classic, *Theory of International Politics*.²⁰ Both are systemic/structural approaches to international politics and both claim to present a theory of international

¹⁶ Peter Hays Gries, *China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2004).

¹⁷ This section draws from Gregory J. Moore, “History, Face and Nationalism in Sino-Japanese Relations,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 15/3 (September, 2010): 18-19; but relies primarily on Peter Hays Gries, *China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2004): 22-23 and 26; and Chie Nakane, *Japanese society* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1970).

¹⁸ Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).

¹⁹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

²⁰ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

politics. Waltz's treatment of the structure of the international system is decidedly material in nature, being based on the distribution of capabilities, whereas Wendt's understanding of the structure of the international system is ideational and social in nature, being based on what he calls "the distribution of ideas," which constitutes the "political culture" of the international system.²¹ In explaining the importance of political culture to IR, Wendt says, "Its political culture is the most fundamental fact about the structure of an international system, giving meaning to power and content to interests, and thus the thing we need to know to explain a "small number of big and important things."²² Drawing from the language of the English School's Martin Wight²³ and noting that the English School's Hedley Bull²⁴ suggests that more than one possible international anarchical structure is possible (i.e., an anarchical society in contrast to a standard Realist atomistic, self-help view of anarchy),²⁵ Wendt sees three possible structures or cultures of anarchy, those three being Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures (see Table 2 below). The Hobbesian culture of anarchy is produced and maintained by force (or the threat thereof), creating a systemic political culture wherein the dominant role states adopt is that of enemies. "An enemy does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as a free subject at all, and therefore seeks to 'revise' the latter's life or liberty (call this 'deep' revisionism')."²⁶ The Lockean culture of anarchy is produced and maintained by bargaining, or price, and constructs a political culture predominantly characterized by states assuming the roles of competitors, wherein states do not see each other as enemies but do compete with each other vociferously in strategic, diplomatic and economic fields. Different in degree to enemies, "a rival, by contrast, is thought to recognize the Self's right to life and liberty, and therefore seeks to revise only its behavior for property ('shallow' revisionism)."²⁷ The Kantian culture of anarchy is produced and maintained by way of mutually recognized sense of legitimacy, and I would add a basic level of trust or social capital as Putnam²⁸ uses it, wherein states come to "shared knowledge of each other's peaceful intentions and behavior."²⁹ Here states expect each other to observe two general rules,

Table 2. Alexander Wendt's 3 Cultures/Structures of Anarchy³⁰

<i>Culture of Anarchy</i>	<i>Dominant Roles</i>	<i>Pathway to Structure Production and Maintenance</i>
Hobbesian	enemies	force
Lockean	competitors	price
Kantian	friends	legitimacy

one being that they will settle disputes in a non-violent manner, and two, that they'll come together in mutual aid if any member is attacked by a third party.³¹ He notes that this mutual aid phenomenon is not

²¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 249-250, 309.

²² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 250.

²³ Martin Wight, "The Three Traditions of International Theory," in G. Wight and B. Porter, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations* (London: Allen and Unwin), 1991.

²⁴ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

²⁵ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 247, 253.

²⁶ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 261.

²⁷ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 261.

²⁸ Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

²⁹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 299.

³⁰ The table is based on Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 247-250.

³¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 298-299.

the collective security one might find in the Hobbesian culture wherein members join an alliance because of fear of elimination (and leave the alliance when they feel safe without it, switch blocs when the balance of power shifts the other way, etc.), but rather should be conceived of as a mutual identification with each other wherein a friend would come to the aid of a friend whether it was (otherwise) in his/her immediate self-interest or not. Another distinction between a collective security arrangement and this “pluralistic security community” is that in the former, members are allied against an outside power or powers, whereas in the latter, disputes are within the group, a necessary assumption given the premise that the “culture of anarchy” in this scenario is now a priori Kantian.³² Wendt notes that these three cultures accord roughly with the three worldviews presented in Realism (Hobbesian), Neo-Liberalism (Lockean) and Idealism (Kantian).³³ In other words, there is no single “logic of anarchy,”³⁴ per se, but rather there are at least three according to Wendt, and all three are social in nature, an important distinction from the Waltzian/materialist version of structure. In fact, Wendt notes that the Realist version of structure is actually strongly social, pointing out that a balance of power is in reality an inherently social phenomenon, states perceiving each other’s capabilities and reacting to each other in turn in such ways as to socially

Table 3: Wendt’s Degrees of Cultural Internalization, Degrees of Society/Cooperation

Degree of Cultural Internalization	3rd			
	2nd			
	1st			
		Hobbesian	Lockean	Kantian
		Degree of Society (Cooperation)		

Source: Alexander Wendt, “Multiple Realization of International Culture,” table, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 254.

³² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 300-301.

³³ I note that in this reference in his book, after discussing Realism/Hobbesianism and Neo-Liberalism/Lockeanism, with Kantianism he links Idealism, which makes sense. Yet after the word “Idealism” Wendt adds “[constructivism?]” in brackets. His addition of the question mark here suggests that at the time of writing he was still thinking through whether or not this “Idealist” view of the world accorded with constructivism, or was posing this as a question. I would suggest that he should remove the reference to constructivism here, for in my view (and I’d argue in his, if he is consistent) constructivism is not strictly idealism, for Wendt in this book correctly stresses the importance of “rump materialism” and in his other work he stresses the role of “structuration” [Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” *International Organization* 41/3 (Summer, 1987): 335-370] which together rightly stress the importance of both material and ideational forces in the agent-structure relationship, which produce structuration, or the co-constitution of agent and structure. On page 268 and elsewhere in the book he more directly equates idealism and constructivism and I believe this is mistaken and can lead to a lot of confusion.

³⁴ Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

create and reify a particular social structure that is said to be materially derived, but in fact, in Wendt's view (and my own) is social (and thereby non-material) in nature.³⁵

In line with this realization, Wendt introduces to his three cultures of anarchy another three categories, the first/lowest, second/medium, and third/highest degrees of cultural internalization, which he juxtaposes against the cultures of anarchy (see Table 3). In the first, lowest, degree of cultural internalization, the actor/state only complies with the will of others when "forced to by the threat of certain, immediate punishment," not because he/the state sees it as being in his interest, but because he is compelled to, behavior in this case being externally driven (as opposed to internally motivated).³⁶ In the second/medium degree of cultural internalization, the actor/state does have a meaningful choice, free from immediate compulsion, but complies with cultural norms because it views doing so as in its self-interest, for instrumental reasons, not having truly internalized/embraced the norms of the culture within which it operates. Here, "...actors accept shared meanings and so there is now a more or less normalized culture, but the acceptance is purely instrumental. As soon as the costs of following the rules outweigh the benefits, actors should change their behavior."³⁷ In the third/highest degree of cultural internalization, actors/states "identify with others' expectations, relating to them as a part of themselves...It is only with this degree of internalization that a norm really constructs agents..."³⁸ Wendt then explains that in each of the three kinds of anarchical culture there is a lower or higher degree of cultural internalization, and that while IR scholarship (referring to Table 3) tends to see Realism, Neo-Liberalism and Idealism as constituting sectors from lower left to middle to upper right, in reality the Hobbesian culture could entail internalization at the third level (upper left in Table 3) and the Kantian culture could entail internalization of level one (lower right corner). Wendt explains that, for example, in a Hobbesian anarchical culture with internalization level three (again, upper left in Table 3), what one might see is that the Hobbesian culture is so deeply entrenched that enemies have come to constitute each other in fact, and that they've come to construct/realize their own identities primarily in opposition to an "evil other," and that such a culture of anarchy is highly resistant to change because of the co-constitution of the actors' identities. Some have posited that the Cold War bipolar structure came to be as such for the US and USSR,³⁹ and this is in line with Wendt's analysis, for indeed the Cold War could not end until one of the actors' (in this case the Soviet Union's) identities was deconstructed and reconceived (as a "liberal" Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin). Wendt concludes that at the Hobbesian level, it is logical to conclude that any state system that has existed for any length of time will engender states with cultural internalization to at least the second degree of internalization, since failing to do so could be fatal,⁴⁰ and that at the Kantian level, one might envision a nascent Kantian culture of anarchy wherein while states had come to view each other as friends, the internalization level was low enough that states had enacted an enforcement mechanism of a robust nature so as to hold accountable any members who were still new or any who might be wavering (or might in the future waver) in their commitment to the norms of the society. Wendt's conclusion is that our present international system, for all of its shortcomings, has already moved beyond a Hobbesian sort of anarchy into the realm of the Lockean culture of anarchy.

Wendt's proffering of this particular understanding of anarchy, building on the work of English School thinkers Wight and Bull before him, introduces a potentially revolutionary effect on our conceptions of international anarchy, international society, and the potentialities of transcending the

³⁵ Ian Johnston's work is important in this case, referring here to his contention that China's strategic culture has historically been *realpolitik* in nature, and that this *realpolitik* is social, learned behavior, not deriving from human nature or anarchic structure. See Alistair Ian Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

³⁶ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 268-269.

³⁷ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 271.

³⁸ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 273.

³⁹ See Wendt's references to Howard Stein and others on pages 276-277. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁴⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 272.

shortcomings of strictly Hobbesian views of our global milieu. A problem, however, remains in our conceptualization of international relations at the regional and foreign policy levels of analysis, for Wendt's conceptualization above is presented at the third, systemic level of analysis, and the question posed in this essay concerns the Northeast Asian regional sub-system. How might we proceed?

Wendt's Cultures of Anarchy at the Regional Sub-System and Second Levels of Analysis

In *Social Theory*, while Wendt is working exclusively at the third/system level of analysis, his cultures of anarchy and other constructivist analytical tools are indeed applicable at the regional sub-system level of analysis, as well as at the second, foreign policy level of analysis, as well.⁴¹ We might refer to the regional sub-system level of analysis as "Level 2.5," being located between the second/state and third/system levels of analysis.⁴² Wendt himself seems to open the door to this approach in that in addition to being found in the international system generally, he notes that his three cultures "may be found in regional sub-systems of the international system – Buzan's 'security complexes'..." as well.⁴³ Surely Buzan and Waever have made the notion of regional security arrangements well known too, so this notion cannot be considered controversial to date.⁴⁴ Consequently, while Wendt does not make this argument himself, it flows logically from his work that his framework can function at the regional level. Moreover, it seems reasonable to suggest that Europe, or at least Western Europe, shares a Kantian/friend culture of anarchy, as well as North America. Northeast Asia must be considered a bit more divided and could only be counted Lockean at best, however.

Wendt is not the only IR theorist (besides Buzan and Waever) to suggest the existence of regional structural subsystems, for indeed even Neo-Realist John Mearsheimer has done so. Mearsheimer discusses a regional systemic level of analysis between the international level and the second level, and even notes the existence of a Northeast Asian regional system.⁴⁵ Consequently, for a structural Realist like Mearsheimer this means the balance of power should operate on the basis of the distribution of capabilities at the regional level, just as it should at the global level, and this is Mearsheimer's argument. He concludes that while a true global hegemon is not likely, achieving a position of hegemon at the regional level is both attractive and possible, as US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere attests, according to Mearsheimer. New regional hegemons might arise, or they might be balanced against and blocked from hegemony, but the US is presently the only regional hegemon, Mearsheimer argues. He believes China is the most likely contender for Northeast Asian regional hegemony, but that presently there is no regional hegemon there, but rather there is a balance of power in the region with the US serving as regional off-shore balancer.

Moving to the second level of analysis, here too Wendt's framework is workable, in particular at the dyadic level. In any consideration of relations between dyads around the world, it seems apparent that relational cultures exist and that they evolve over time. If an international structure can logically be called Hobbesian or Lockean or Kantian (and I agree with Wendt that this is logical), it makes even more

⁴¹ I have made this case elsewhere. See Gregory J. Moore, "Not Very Material but Hardly Immaterial: China's Bombed Embassy and Sino-American Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 6 (2010): 23-41.

⁴² Waltz spoke of the three levels of analysis in his *Man, the State and War*, or more specifically, the first level of analysis being the individual policy-maker level, the second being that of the state or "foreign policy level," and the third level being that of the international system. Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

⁴³ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 257. Wendt's reference to Buzan is Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), but more recently Buzan and Ole Waever have co-authored another important volume on the subject, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁴⁴ See Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁴⁵ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001): 40-1, 138-41.

sense at the second/state level and even the first/individual level given the smaller degree of abstraction involved.⁴⁶ Certainly anyone knows that both nations and individuals can have enemies, competitors and friends. Napoleonic France's invasion of Imperial Russian made the latter her enemy and Japan's invasion of China in 1931 and 1937 made the latter an enemy, just as British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt became friends, as did US President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. One might argue that China and the US were enemies (Hobbesian) during the Cold War years, were friends (Kantian) during the Nixon/Kissinger days, and then have suffered from a series of ups and downs since 1989, moving from Kantian to Hobbesian to Lockean to Hobbesian, etc., settling in what might be considered a Lockean equilibrium for the time being. While Realists of all stripes claim relations between China and the United States is best accounted for by Realism,⁴⁷ if this depiction of Sino-American relations is correct, Realism would at best only logically account for the Hobbesian stages, and that is not even certain.⁴⁸ If indeed Wendt's analysis of cultures of anarchy, or relational cultures, can be applied at the regional and dyadic levels, what are the implications of this for Northeast Asian regional international relations?

Northeast Asian Regional International Relations





What is needed at this point is an assessment of the dyadic cultures of Northeast Asian international relations across time. Below, Alignments A-H illustrate visually in highly simplified form the alignment patterns and relational positioning of the major actors in eight representative historical periods in Northeast Asian regional history, from the Chinese-dominated Tributary System to the present, and finally looking into the future at possible future alignments and relational patterns. To the right of each graphic depiction of past, present and possible future Northeast Asian alignment patterns are the corresponding Figures A-H, which represent the respective relational cultures of each dyad in the regional system of the era. Given that Kantian relational culture represents the highest level of cooperation and Hobbesian culture the lowest, Kantian culture is coded as 3, Lockean as 2, and Hobbesian as 1. Here Wendt's degrees of cultural internalization will not be integrated into the analysis, as they introduce a level of complexity and require a level of historical research that is too much for this study. For each historical regional depiction, the dyadic cultures of each pair of states are presented, then added together, then divided by the number of dyadic pairings, which yields a "score" on Wendt's now quantified relational culture scale, from Hobbes/1 to Locke/2 to Kant/3. This is a rough and simple, but still useful,

Assessing Cooperation in N.E. Asia using Wendt's 3 Cultures

⁴⁶ I draw here from Gregory J. Moore, "Conclusions," in Gregory J. Moore, ed., *North Korean Nuclear Operationality: Implications for Regional Security and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime* (forthcoming).

⁴⁷ See John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Yan Xuetong, *Zhongguo Guojia Liyi Fenxi* [An Analysis of China's National Interests] (Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1997); Yuan-kang Wang, *Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), etc.

⁴⁸ In my own research, I have found that non-material, non-Realist approaches had greater explanatory power than material, Realist approaches in the following three cases, the most significant low-points in the bilateral relationship between 1989 and 2000: the 1989 Tiananmen Square case, the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, and the 1999 US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. See Gregory J. Moore, "Not Very Material but Hardly Immaterial: China's Bombed Embassy and Sino-American Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 6 (2010): 23-41; Gregory J. Moore, "The Roles of Misperceptions and Perceptual Gaps in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996," in Shiping Hua and Sujian Guo, eds., *China in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities*, New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2007; and Gregory J. Moore, *Tiananmen, Taiwan and Belgrade: The Construction of Conflict in Sino-American Relations – 1989, 1995-96, and 1999*, Doctoral dissertation (Denver, Colorado: Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 2004).

<p>Alignment A: Major powers in N.E. Asia Under China's Tributary System,1368-1841</p> 	<p>Figure A: Score: 12/6=2.0 Major powers in N.E. Asia Under China's Tributary System,1368-1841</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="998 304 1274 567"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>C</th> <th>J</th> <th>K</th> <th>M</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th>C</th> <td>-</td> <td>3</td> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>J</th> <td>3</td> <td>-</td> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>K</th> <td>3</td> <td>3</td> <td>-</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>M</th> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>-</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		C	J	K	M	C	-	3	3	1	J	3	-	3	1	K	3	3	-	1	M	1	1	1	-																								
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<p>Alignment B: N.E. Asia,1911-1930</p> 	<p>Figure B: Score: 11/6=1.8 N.E. Asia,1911-1930</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="998 682 1263 945"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>C</th> <th>J</th> <th>K</th> <th>R</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th>C</th> <td>-</td> <td>2</td> <td>2</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <th>J</th> <td>2</td> <td>-</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <th>K</th> <td>2</td> <td>1</td> <td>-</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <th>R</th> <td>2</td> <td>2</td> <td>2</td> <td>-</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		C	J	K	R	C	-	2	2	2	J	2	-	1	2	K	2	1	-	2	R	2	2	2	-																								
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<p>Alignment C: Greater E. Asia Co. Prosperity Sphere,1931-1945</p> 	<p>Figure C: Score: 20/10=2.0 "Greater E. Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," 1931-1945</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="998 1102 1339 1323"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>C</th> <th>J</th> <th>K</th> <th>R</th> <th>US</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th>C</th> <td>-</td> <td>1</td> <td>3</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <th>J</th> <td>1</td> <td>-</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>K</th> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> <td>-</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <th>R</th> <td>2</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>-</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <th>US</th> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> <td>3</td> <td>3</td> <td>-</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		C	J	K	R	US	C	-	1	3	2	3	J	1	-	1	1	1	K	3	1	-	2	3	R	2	1	2	-	3	US	3	1	3	3	-													
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<p>Alignment D: Cold War in N.E. Asia,1960</p> 	<p>Figure D: Score: 27/15=1.8 Cold War in N.E. Asia,1960</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="982 1444 1421 1701"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>C</th> <th>J</th> <th>SK</th> <th>NK</th> <th>R</th> <th>US</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th>C</th> <td>-</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>3</td> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>J</th> <td>1</td> <td>-</td> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <th>SK</th> <td>1</td> <td>3</td> <td>-</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <th>NK</th> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>-</td> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>R</th> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>3</td> <td>-</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>US</th> <td>1</td> <td>3</td> <td>3</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>-</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		C	J	SK	NK	R	US	C	-	1	1	3	3	1	J	1	-	3	1	1	3	SK	1	3	-	1	1	3	NK	3	1	1	-	3	1	R	3	1	1	3	-	1	US	1	3	3	1	1	-
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Key to diagrams:

1=Enemies (Hobbesian); 2=Competitors (Lockian); 3=Friends (Kantian)
 C=China; J=Japan; K=Unified Korea; SK=South Korea; NK=North Korea
 M=Mongols; R=Russia (USSR in Cold War); US=United States




Figure E: **Score: 29/15=1.9**
Cold War in N.E. Asia,1980

	C	J	SK	NK	R	US
C	-	2	2	3	1	3
J	2	-	3	1	1	3
SK	2	3	-	1	1	3
NK	3	1	1	-	3	1
R	1	1	1	3	-	1
US	3	3	3	1	1	-




Figure F: **Score: 30/15=2.0**
N.E. Asia Today

	C	J	SK	NK	R	US
C	-	2	2	3	2	2
J	2	-	2	1	2	3
SK	2	2	-	1	2	3
NK	3	1	1	-	2	1
R	2	2	2	2	-	2
US	2	3	3	1	2	-




Figure G: **Score: 35/15=2.3**
N.E. Asia Beyond History:
The Potential Near Term

	C	J	SK	NK	R	US
C	-	2	3	3	2	2
J	2	-	3	2	2	3
SK	3	3	-	2	2	3
NK	3	2	2	-	2	2
R	2	2	2	2	-	2
US	2	3	3	2	2	-




Figure H: **Score: 18/6=3.0**
N.E. Asia Beyond History
The Potential Long Term?

	C	J	K	R
C	-	3	3	3
J	3	-	3	3
K	3	3	-	3
R	3	3	3	-

Key to diagrams:

1=Enemies (Hobbesian); 2=Competitors (Lockian); 3=Friends (Kantian)
 C=China; J=Japan; K=Unified Korea; SK=South Korea; NK=North Korea
 R=Russia (USSR in Cold War); US=United States

way to assess the international relations of the Northeast Asian region over the course of each of these historical eras. A brief description of each of the historical eras depicted here and the dyadic relations depicted therein follows.

While the study could go back to pre-Qin times, or break Northeast Asian regional history up into regional dynastic eras (such as the Chinese Ming or Korean Chosun eras, etc.), instead a simplified but basically accurate portrayal of the region's IR situation is portrayed here as the region's Tributary System under Chinese dominance that David Kang⁴⁹ defines as existing from 1368 to 1841, from the Ming through the Qing Dynasties up to the British incursion into Chinese affairs and the Opium Wars of 1839-1841, which China lost and which in effect ended the Tributary System (See Alignment/Figure A). The major actors in this era are China, Korea, Japan and the Mongols. Other actors, such as the Manchus, could be added, but for simplicity (and with no real sacrifice in accuracy given that the Manchus overtook China and then were in effect subsumed by China) these others were left out. It might be noted that for parsimony, one key but relatively brief era was factored out of the depiction presented here, and that is the wars of Japan against Korea and (with China's counter attack) China between 1592 and 1598, which reduced relations between Japan and its neighbors to a Hobbesian level, needless to say, but after which, things returned for the most part to the status quo. Note also that while Japan had little contact with the Mongols, what contact they did have (the Mongols tried to invade Japan but were turned back by "the divine wind") could be consistently characterized as Hobbesian and so the Hobbesian level (one) is depicted here for the Mongol-Japanese dyad. The combined dyads here yield a score of 2.0. If the Mongols were excluded the system would be Kantian, but the Mongol factor brings the relational culture level down.

Following this (Alignment/Figure B) is a depiction of the post-Chinese-dynastic 1911-1930 period characterized in particular by China's turn to Republicanism, Japan's participation in the Eurocentric "great game" of imperial geo-politics (but prior to Japan's invasion of China and the Southeast Asian nations), and Japan's *fait accompli* of annexing Korea. It was an era of relative harmony in the modern era of the region, save for the Korea-Japan issue, registering a 1.8 on the Wendtian scale. The US is not depicted as it was not a major player in the region as it would become later.

Next historically of course is WW2, or the "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere"⁵⁰ era of 1931-1945, characterized by Japan's invasion and occupation of most of the region (Alignment/Figure C). The US is introduced into the system here because it was also attacked by Japan and because it was engaged directly in the defense of China (e.g., the "Flying Tigers," Doolittle's Raids landing in China, etc.), and was instrumental in fighting and ultimately defeating Japan, restoring some order to the region. Though Hobbesian unrest characterized the region, the numbers are higher here because of the unifying effect of antipathy to Japan by Japan's victims and the United States, yielding a score of 2.0.

This era is followed by a treatment of the Cold War era (Alignments/Figures D and E). The Cold War era is depicted in two snapshots, one in 1960 and one in 1980. This is done because the former depicts the classic East-West (USSR/China/North Korea vs. US/Japan/South Korea/ROC) divide. With China's turn to the West in the 1970s, things change dramatically in East Asia (see Alignment E), for now the USSR/Russia is marginalized and China's "tacit alliance" with the US⁵¹ put it in alignment with the Western bloc against the Soviet Union. The 1960 era yielded a regional culture score of 1.8 (Figure D), which bumped up to 1.9 (Figure E) with China's reforms and turn to the West.

The next alignment and figure depicted (F) is that of Northeast Asia as it is today. It is characterized by Kantian relations between China and North Korea, and between the US, Japan and South Korea, yielding a regional culture score of 2.0. This is to say today's situation clearly presents a more cooperative situation than was the case in the Cold War. It is equally clear, however, that things could be better in the region and greater levels of cooperation are being held back by the issues discussed above.

⁴⁹ David C. Kang, "Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute System in Early Modern East Asia," *Security Studies*, 19: 4 (2010): 591 — 622

⁵⁰ This is of course the name the Japanese themselves gave to their empire in East Asia.

⁵¹ Again, these are Henry Kissinger's words.

Finally, Alignments/Figures G and H depict two possible future regional alignment and relational patterns. These are by no means exclusive. Poor relations between the region's states could easily lead to a devolution back to Alignment D, with the East and West separated as in the earlier Cold War pattern. However, as it regards Alignment G, and barring the more monumental changes such as the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, the reunification of China and Taiwan, etc, a simple depiction of Northeast Asia if it were to move "beyond history" in resolving its basic fundamental historical grievances (even without yet resolving the security conflicts) is depicted here. This would entail Japan addressing its history issue to the satisfaction of its neighbors, the US finding a newer more constructive approach to North Korea, North Korea backing away from its road to nuclear confrontation, among other things, given the present structural realities and Cold War security hold-overs. Figure G yields a regional culture rating of 2.4, a large improvement over the present 2.0. Alignment H depicts an even more desirable, certainly idealized potential Northeast Asia characterized by a wholly Kantian relational culture wherein all that is entailed in Alignment G above is present, plus the Korean Peninsula is reunified, as are China and Taiwan, the Cold War divisions are finally laid to rest, the territorial disputes are dealt with to everyone's basic satisfaction (ie, while not ideal, the states find a reasonable solution acceptable to all), among a few other things. This one is not yet on the horizon to be sure, but with a 3.0, wholly Kantian regional culture, it depicts something the region can aspire to.

Conclusions

What does all of this mean for Northeast Asian international relations and the potential of higher levels of cooperation? First, I might say that while the focus of the broader project of which this is a part is addressing the issue of Northeast Asian regional integration, this study shows why cooperation is a better goal (and indicator) of positive regional interaction than integration per se. During the so-called "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere" era the highest level of regional integration was achieved, but as must be obvious from even the most basic assessment, and is apparent in the depictions of Wendt's relational cultures above, this high level of regional integration was achieved under duress (to put it mildly) and this higher level of regional integration was not reflective of anything positive or cooperative. As Realists and others have pointed out, hierarchy (which is what Japan achieved in this era) is one possible alternative to anarchy, but it not necessarily an attractive one. Based on the dyadic numbers above, the region could be assessed at the 2.0/Lockean level, which reflects the fact that aggression invites Kantian balancing/alliances which counteracts the slide into Hobbesian relations (mathematically speaking, a 1.0/enemy relation might be balanced by a 3.0/alliance/friendship with another power, working out as a 2.0/competitive level of relational culture). However, if the US was removed (it is included because it too was attacked by Japan and because it was highly engaged in the region fighting with China against Japan), and all the "3s" the US brings to the picture (and a 1 with Japan), the score moves to a more sober 1.67. So if integration is the goal in and of itself, empire is a fine tool, and wars bring allies as well as the conquered (under the flag of the conqueror) together. Cooperation is what the nations of the region truly seek, however, and it is a better goal and indicator of relational progress read as a movement away from the Hobbesian morass and toward the better Lockean and Kantian alternatives.

Secondly, movement from "Northeast Asia Today" (Alignment/Figure F) to "Northeast Asia Beyond History: The Potential Near Term" (Alignment/Figure G) would mark significant progress in the level of cooperation, and if Putnam is right and we can indeed apply this to IR as I believe we can, life in Northeast Asia will be better for all parties. For if nothing else, more of the region's resources might be directed away from military and security expenditures and toward more productive economic, infrastructural, educational and other expenditures. A movement from F (today) to G (beyond history), moving relational culture scores of 2.0 to 2.3, is predicated on the assumptions that the Japanese better manage their responsibility for history, the actors in the region move beyond their historical grievances, China and Taiwan (ROC) at minimum do nothing violent (China) or "declaratory" (Taiwan in reference to

independence) to alter the status quo, the US works out some *modus vivendi* with North Korea⁵² and North Korea ceases and desists from going down the nuclear weapons path it is presently on (which is opposed by every other nation in the region), the nations do not let their islands/territory disputes get out of hand, China continues to provide sufficient reassurances of its peaceful intentions (and behavior to match) as its material capabilities increase, the US does what it can to prevent its alliances with Seoul and Tokyo (and its defensive commitments to Taipei) from appearing as provocative to Beijing, Pyongyang and/or Moscow, and a few other basic issues that do not presuppose Kantian-level trust can be achieved in short order, or that deeper security issues can be solved (such as the DPRK/ROK or PRC/ROC divides) any time soon. Moreover, if something like the alignment depicted in “Northeast Asia Beyond History: The Potential Long Term?” (Alignment/Figure H) can be achieved in the longer term, needless to say things will be all that much better. None of this presupposes any movement away from the nation state as basic actor in the region or a surrender of sovereignty to regional or international organizations, which may or may not be viewed as positive goods by states in the region (certainly it would not by China!).

Lastly, I think this study lends support to constructivists’ and English School adherents’ contentions that the anarchical world that the region (and by implication the world) is embedded in is not in fact a Hobbesian sort of anarchy as Realists would have us believe. In fact, the states of the region have already constructed an environment, or even a society, in which certain basic levels of reciprocity, expectation-meeting, and in some cases even amiability have been found. As Wendt says is true of the culture of anarchy in the international system as a whole, Lockean competition or rivalry is a more accurate description of the primary regional relational culture in Northeast Asia. The implication is that Realism may not be an accurate description of a regional milieu that is Lockean. Therefore, perhaps no one in the region will in fact bring into effect a robust balancing move against China. Perhaps the United States might choose a “sunshine policy” of its own to woo Pyongyang out of its autarkic cave. Maybe North Korea will find enough good will in its neighborhood that it might consider laying down its nuclear weapons programs. If the region (or the world) is not actually Hobbesian, then there is no reason to believe such things are utopian. In Lockean or Kantian worlds they are possible, even realistic.

It all seems that the first and most basic steps along this road to improved dyadic cultures and an improved regional anarchic culture must be found in effectively and satisfactorily dealing with the history issue as part of the solution to regional trust building. Moving “beyond history” is particularly important in a region such as Northeast Asia wherein the peoples have great reverence for the past, where they “walk forward while looking backward” for guidance in facing the future, and where “face politics” is so important. If this study is any indicator, there is much room for hope that the past is not the future in Northeast Asia.

⁵² I have suggested a possible solution in Gregory J. Moore, “America’s Failed North Korea Policy: A New Approach,” *Asian Perspective*, 32/4 (Winter, 2008).