The paper I am going to give you is more of a concept paper rather than an empirical study. It’s still work in progress and has been in incubation for years. It’s based on interviews with key players in the region over the years including two Myanmar foreign ministers, many other ministers in the region, and of course many Myanmar diplomats and those military intelligence people during the days of Khin Nyunt. I’ve chosen here to concentrate on what I see is the key priority in Myanmar’s key foreign policy. This has been accentuated since Thaksin took par although wasn’t necessarily a break from the past. It’s what I’d like to turn the ASEAN first policy.

This policy approach is now the corner stone of Myanmar’s foreign policy in what is solely now a transition period. Like other areas that were delved into yesterday, peace process, the media, we were told these were complicated. I prefer to see what’s happening through the prison of continuity and change. And l would like to stress that for me 2011 was not a water shed, undoubted to believe things happened afterwards that have been welcomed. But I think the start of the reform process is misplaced. It was always a part of an overall strategy that the military leadership had adopted and it served as Than Shwe’s strategy. In early 2004, I had a long chat with Khin Nyunt about the road map. And I said the last stage of the road map is a transition government. How long is a transition government? 10 to 20 years. I saw Khin Nyunt last year and I asked, is Than Shwe’s gun still armed? He said yes. I think it’s probably cut now more to 10 years than 20. The point is that I think it’s a mistake to often see too much of a divide between what happened before 2011 and what is happening since. The importance of foreign policy in this process is underlined by the fact that the foreign minister is a member of the National Defense and Security Council. He’s one of the few members in the committee. The others are of course concerned about strategic issues or defense. I think it also important to know according to my sources Than Shwe actually appointed about seven ministers in Thein Sein’s government before elections of 2010. And one of them is the foreign minister. So he is a Than Shwe man. The previous foreign minister Nyan Win was given the sort of chief minister for pagan.He also told me he was going to be the chief minister of the last ASEAN meeting in 2010. The new foreign minister, unlike his predecessor, is fluent in English and has had experience abroad. He served in Geneva. He’s someone that can be trusted with foreign policy in a transition period that may be difficult. So there’s no doubt that foreign policy was seen as something important to the leaders of the military regime before 2010 and was wanted to make sure that the corner stones of the future were laid. It’s important to understand that for Myanmar leaders both in the past and the present, foreign policy has been an intrinsically part of its domestic policy. It’s been used to strengthen the rules of political power to make sure internal objectives are achieved.

Since 1988, there has been perceived, persistent need to have an international security umbrella. When the country perceives interests in need, demanded foreign policy instruments were activated. Back in the early 1990s, after the decision to ignore the results of election, Khin Nyunt ordered the foreign ministry to explore possibilities of entering regional and international organizations, especially ASEAN. It was these from Myanmar that prompted the influential members of ASEAN to initiate their constructive engagement policy, and particularly Indonesia and Thailand. Of course there were divergent views within the government at the time. The military intelligence and supporters of Khin Nyunt were pushing for engagement with the outside world. And so ASEAN as firstly be much more likely to be responsive and secondly less contentious. And the conservative of isolated row which included Than Shwe were resistant. Eventually the pragmatists won. I was at the first ASEAN summit which Myanmar presented, and I saw Than Shwe arrive at the red carpet. It was a stark that Than Shwe was at the middle and other leaders of the region were around him. It was like a protective group and Than Shwe was looking strong and confident. I think Than Shwe at that time must have thought that the decision was correct to join ASEAN. After the political and security crisis with the aftermath of the attack on the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in middle 2003, the foreign ministry was ordered to conduct diplomatic charm offensive, primarily in Asia and particularly in ASEAN. U Khin Maung Win, who was the deputy foreign minister at the time, was dispatched. They also had a from Than Shwe, which outlined their concerns. They believed that was a campaign to overthrow the Myanmar on Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday. I think it was something he regretted sometime after. But it did have an effect on Than Shwe. Sources say appointed Khin Nyunt as prime minister so he could get out going into the ASEAN meetings and bearing the criticism.]ASEAN actually decided in a statement to say Aung San Suu Kyi should be released immediately and unconditionally. It was even still in the books. But from the ASEAN’s point of view, it was symbolic and foreign ministers all told us how important it was. But there was no action. The Than Shwe I think decided that ASEAN was no longer as useful to the country’s security needs or internal issues. And there was a period that I would call disengagement with the ASEAN. They did not leave. And there were discussions on whether Myanmar should be kicked out. The Malaysia foreign minister said that they could kick Myanmar out as long as 9 foreign ministers agree. The Myanmar side then said if you went that far, we could resign anyway. So it was a case of pastry on both sides. But what was true was the disaffection with ASEAN. We saw attempts of ASEAN particularly to have a dialogue that would promote the road map, the Bangkok process after one meeting Than Shwe pulled a plug on it. That was a realization that it was still important to have good relations with the neighbors. It was just an organization and ASEAN may not be the vehicle to do that. Than Shwe had a very good relationship with Thaksin Shinawatra. And so I think the Myanmar position favored bilateral relations within south-east Asia rather than multilateral.

This all changed in 2008 with Cyclone Nargis coming. Myanmar, the UN,ASEAN worked together and there was a realization that firstly in terms of crisis and natural disasters, you need help from outside. This was a very successful operation and it relied heavily on ASEAN initiative. And I’m not here to debate or discuss the relief efforts afterwards, but XXX was achieved, which would not be achieved if ASEAN hadn’t taken a coordinating role. And the deputy foreign minister was officially at the coordinating committee. It was Thein sein the prime minister at the time who was the real lead. XX once told me that without Thein Sein’s support, he would never have been able to achieve what he did. He always complained that I kept asking him, Thein Sein was the prime minister, did you see the man. He said, don’t ask me, no I didn’t see Than Shwe, but I don’t think I need to. There’s no doubt talking to people around at the time before the elections, Thein Sein was profoundly affected by what happened during August. He saw firsthand the devastation and he saw firsthand the kind of relief efforts that ASEAN was able to mobilize. That has prompted Thein Sein’s ASEAN first approach. They realized ASEAN benign approach. It was not with the west, it did not want regime change, nor it want to embarrass the country. I believe that was when the need of active, open and forward-looking policy took root.

ASEAN was a model organization for Burma to be part of. It is a model organization although people in the west will not accept that for Burma to be part of now. Because it represents the old values of nonalignment, which of course under pinched Myanmar’s approach of the foreign policy. I prefer to consider the influence of ASEAN as an interlocutor and patron during the days if“flexible engagement”. I believe that people did not give ASEAN sufficient credit to having influenced the Myanmar leaders, particularly after 2008 in seeing that change was necessary. It was not something to be frightened of, it was something to embrace. And they did it not by barking like a dog but something like a characteristic approach, and we publicly condemn them when they come to the summits cuz we have to. The American governments are on our back, you are on our back, we’ve got to make decision. And they privately we said what can we do to help? Can we offer training to your electioneers? And I think there is little doubt in my mind that they have managed to influence the regime. And that’s why I think it’s quite consistent that Thein Sein should have ASEAN first policy. The other thing I have noticed is the professionalization of the foreign ministry. This again started before 2010. The government decided that it was Important to give diplomats training abroad, and they sent them to various countries including Thailand for training. And I can tell you first hand because I teach in one of them. 10 years ago, I used to have someone from the embassy attend part-time. In the last 5 years, we’ve had full time students for 2 year courses. Some of my students are in key position in south-east Asia. It is a hardening change. It’s the most independent ISIS in the region, it’s a real model. They are discussing policy issues and are feeding into Myanmar’s leadership of ASEAN this year. Thank you.